A Houthi Rebel walks into the Bank of England, and, no, this isn’t the start of a joke. The rebel opens fire. Bullets tear through furniture, cushions spill their stuffing, and the room fills with smoke. The British employee looks at the carnage and apologises, “Sorry about the mess.”
The rebel has long left the building, and the bill is only just arriving.
From the Red Sea to British Shelves
Several thousand miles away the Houthis are attacking ships in the Red Sea and have been doing so since late 2023. These attacks have forced commercial vessels to divert, taking longer routes around Africa. By early 2024, shipping rates had surged around the Suez Canal and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait.
But the cost of conflict extends beyond longer journeys and damaged vessels. Attacks raise the perceived risk of transiting the region, increasing insurance premiums and shipping costs1. These additional expenses are passed through the supply chain to UK importers and consumers via higher prices. The net effect: higher inflation.
Pricing the Risk
I spoke with a marine insurance broker, to understand how this threat translates into financial cost. “The numbers tell a story of their own” they explained, “Insurance rates for Saudi Red Sea transits reached 2% in September before falling to 1.5%. To put it in perspective, before the crisis, rates were around 0.3-0.6%. Continued attacks, potential legal repercussions and environmental damage are sustaining significant disruption to commercial shipping.”
Higher insurance premiums are only part of the bill. The costs of shipping through a high-risk region extend beyond the insurance policy itself. Charterers also face the additional expense of getting cargo to its destination. They contend with higher freight rates, longer routes that burn more fuel, and higher operational costs. With fewer vessels willing to transit these high-risk areas, reduced capacity puts further pressure on freight rates.
The question is one of economic incidence: who bears the cost? If British businesses end up paying more to transport goods, some of that cost could find its way into the prices on British shelves.
UK inflation rose from 3.1% to 3.5% in September 2026, above the Bank of England’s 2% target. The Houthis are not responsible for those figures, but their attacks illustrate how a conflict thousands of miles away can transmit an inflationary shock to the UK.
For the Bank of England, this presents an awkward dilemma. Raising interest rates will not make the Red Sea safer, lower insurance premiums or shorten a ship’s journey round Africa. But if higher transport costs keep prices rising for longer, the Bank may eventually have to hike rates further or hold rates higher for longer. The central bank is left managing the inflationary consequences of a conflict it has little power to resolve.
Interest rates cannot fix a supply shock in the Red Sea, but the inflation it imports can still keep UK rates higher for longer.
The Price of Peace
Under cap-and-trade, companies can pollute up to a limit, and if a company pollutes below its threshold, it can trade its remaining permits with other companies, creating financial incentives to reduce emissions. Now imagine applying a similar principle to the economic damage caused by conflict. Suppose the British government distributed a permit called BOMB. Not the explosive kind, more so the ‘Billable Offences for Military Belligerence.’ Each permit covers one attack on global trade, exceed your allowance and pay. Hold back and you can sell what you haven’t used. In this world, Saudi Arabia’s $1bn isn’t a ransom, it buys permits off the Houthis, and retires them, taking them off the market for good.
Kyriakou et al. (2026) recommend monitoring shipping costs as a source of risk. But that manages the consequences of disruption rather than preventing it. What if, rather than simply managing the economic fallout of geopolitical disruption, we tried to change the incentives behind it?
Imagine you could trade geopolitical risk the same way we trade pollution permits.
Under cap-and-trade, companies can buy and sell permits to pollute, creating financial incentives to reduce emissions. Now imagine applying a similar principle to the economic damage caused by conflict. Suppose the British government issued permits called BOMB. Not the explosive kind, more so the ‘Billable Offences for Military Belligerence.’ Each permit covers an attack on global trade, exceed your allowance and pay. Hold back and you can sell what you haven’t used. In this world, Saudi Arabia’s $1bn isn’t a ransom, it buys permits off the Houthis, and retires them, taking them off the market for good.
Of course, the Houthis won’t apply for permits, let alone respect a cap set in Whitehall. So, perhaps the target should be the networks that help sustain them, such as the oil traders, and the financial intermediaries that help fund their operations.
Back to Threadneedle Street
Fewer attacks could mean lower insurance premiums, cheaper freight, and less imported inflation. BOMB won’t be the answer (unfortunately), but it points to a bigger question: why should British consumers and businesses bear the cost of a conflict they had no part in, whilst the Bank of England is left managing the fallout?
Monetary policy can respond to the bill. It cannot stop it from arriving. Perhaps it's time to think harder about who should be paying it in the first place.
- U.S. Government Steps into War Risk Market to Offset Middle East Disruptions (Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads, March 2026)
- Interview with a marine insurance broker (October 2026)
- $1 Billion For Peace? Report Flags A Secret Saudi Deal With Houthis Via Iran (NDTV)
- Kyriakou, I., Ghahramanpour, S., Marchese, M., Moutzouris, I. and Copeland, C. L., Policy Bulletin 010: Shipping Freight Costs and UK Inflation Dynamics (UK National Clean Maritime Research Hub, October 2026)

